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S H O R T A R T I C L E
Genetic Attributions: Sign of Intolerance
or Acceptance?
Stephen P. Schneider, University of Nebraska–Lincoln
Kevin B. Smith, University of Nebraska–Lincoln
John R. Hibbing, University of Nebraska–Lincoln
Many scholars argue that people who attribute human characteristics to genetic causes also tend to hold politically and
socially problematic attitudes. More specifically, public acceptance of genetic influences is believed to be associated with
intolerance, prejudice, and the legitimation of social inequities and laissez-faire policies. We test these expectations with
original data from two nationally representative samples that allow us to identify the American public’s attributional
patterns across 18 diverse traits. Key findings are (1) genetic attributions are actually more likely to be made by liberals,
not conservatives; (2) genetic attributions are associated with higher, not lower, levels of tolerance of vulnerable in-
dividuals; and (3) genetic attributions do not correlate with unseemly racial attitudes.
Why do people believe that individuals are the waythey are? This is an important question becausethe presumed causes of personal traits and behav-
iors are known to have a significant influence on the public
attitudes and policies directed at individuals displaying those
traits and behaviors (Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008). To fully
understand the attitudes and policies on issues as diverse as
obesity, drug addiction, and sexual orientation is impossible
without understanding what the public believes causes those
traits. Despite this importance, current understanding of such
causal attributions and their political implications is mud-
dled.
A long-held, central assertion of academic theorizing on
the topic is that people who attribute human characteristics
to genetic causes are more likely to be conservative, intol-
erant, and racist (e.g., Gould 1996; Lewontin, Rose, and Ka-
min 1984). The basic logic follows essentialism: if traits are
seen as unchangeable and map onto existing social differences,
inequalities, and hierarchies, then these differences, inequalities,
and hierarchies are likely to be viewed as part of a natural order
that government policy should not and cannot change (Heine
et al. 2017). Yet for at least one highly salient trait—sexual
orientation—genetic attribution is clearly correlated with more
liberal and tolerant attitudes (Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008;
Joslyn and Haider-Markel 2016; Suhay and Jayaratne 2013).
The “born that way” perspective argues that acceptance of di-
verse sexual orientations is enhanced by recognizing the deep
biological bases of those orientations.
Three factors have prevented empirical investigations
from reconciling these opposing views. First, most previous
studies examine only a small number of traits, making it
difficult to draw broader conclusions. Second, previously em-
ployed survey probes tend to lack precision, asking respon-
dents only to assess the importance of genetics to variation in a
given trait even as people undoubtedly have vastly different
thresholds for what counts as “important” (Shostak et al.
2009). Third, available survey items often lump all nonge-
netic causes together (e.g., Shostak et al. 2009), even though
personal choice and environmental sources are quite differ-
ent. Survey respondents need a fuller range of options for a
couple of reasons. First, when given the option, the lay public
ascribes substantial influence specifically to human agency
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(Condit et al. 2006). In contrast, behavioral genetics meth-
odologies typically do not recognize or estimate personal
choice (personal choice, if real, would be present in the error
term of these estimation techniques, but there would be no
way to distinguish its influence from measurement error).
Second, the key theoretical construct distinguishing among
causes appears to be the presumed ability of the individual to
control his or her behavior (on controllability, see Weiner
1985). Genetics is perceived by the public as largely beyond
the control of individuals (although recent discoveries on epi-
genetics raise doubts about this), while the environment con-
tains both uncontrollable (exposure to chemicals while in the
womb) and controllable (avoiding walking right past the bar)
elements. In addition to genetics and the environment, we thus
include a third, distinct attributional category that is clearly
controllable, and we refer to it as personal choice.
In order to improve previous instrumentation strategies,
we measured attributions across a large and diverse set of
traits (the 18 traits listed in table 1) and for each set asked re-
spondents to partition the influence of three potential causes—
genetics, the environment, and personal choice—so that these
influences summed to 100%. For example, if people believe
drug addiction to be primarily the result of autonomous
personal choice and only slightly attributable to genetics and
to the environment, they might attribute 70% to personal
choice, 15% to genetics, and 15% to environmental causes.
These items on attributions along with additional items on
political orientation, demographics, tolerance, and racial at-
titudes were then included in two specially commissioned
surveys administered to nationally representative samples by
YouGov (see the appendix, available online, for sampling de-
tails and all item wordings). The first survey (N p 600; fielded
in the spring of 2015) focused on the degree towhich attributions
covaried with tolerance, and the second (N p 600; fielded in
the late summer of 2015) concentrated on the connection to
trait attributions and attitudes concerning race.
In table 1, we present people’s attributions for the 18 traits
included in the first survey. This descriptive information is
interesting and important in its own right. Perceptions of the
role of genetics vary widely depending on the trait. At the top
end, people believe that height and mental disabilities are
shaped primarily by genetics, with only a small role remaining
for the environment and personal choice. At the bottom end,
people believe that genetics plays very little role (under 10%)
in shaping people’s political and religious views. Aptitudes and
personality traits are arrayed in between these extremes. The
wisdom of including personal choice as a distinct option is
apparent in the table. In fact, averaging across all traits, peo-
ple are more likely to see personal choice than environmen-
tal factors as a source of trait variance.
We now turn to our core objective, which is to ascertain
whether individuals who tend to attribute a large role to ge-
netics are more (or less) likely to be politically conservative,
intolerant, and racially prejudiced. Since our data are correla-
tional, they do not indicate whether attributional tendencies
affect ideology, tolerance, and racism, or the other way around.
Fortunately, sorting out the causal order is not necessary be-
cause we are only interested in the degree to which genetic
attributions are accompanied by particular political and so-
cial attitudes. Given uncertainty about the causal order, in-
stead of using regression analysis, we calculated partial cor-
relations between genetic attributions and the concepts of
interest while controlling for the usual variables: age, income,
education, race (whitep 1, nonwhitep 0), sex (femalep 1,
malep 0), and frequency of church attendance. Our primary
measure of ideology was YouGov’s standard five-point item
ranging from 1p strong liberal to 5p strong conservative
(alternatives to this measure are analyzed in the appendix).
Our main variable (the degree to which each respondent at-
tributed traits to genetics) was calculated by averaging each
Table 1. Attribution of 18 Traits to Genetics,
the Environment, and Personal Choice (%)
Mean Attribution To:
Trait Genetics
Environmental
Factors
Personal
Choice
Height 88.52 6.48 5.00
Mentally disabled 80.33 13.01 6.66
Handedness 73.73 10.51 15.77
Intelligence 56.12 20.39 23.50
Being homosexual 50.94 15.71 33.36
Athletic ability 50.68 16.33 32.99
Obese 41.77 21.82 36.41
Anxious or neurotic 37.48 36.42 26.11
Extroverted 35.67 32.75 31.58
Aptitude for language 35.13 28.32 36.55
Eating disorder 23.70 37.66 38.64
Conscientiousness 23.56 29.32 47.12
Addicted to drugs 20.62 32.32 47.06
Open to new
experiences 17.69 31.77 50.54
Tolerant of
differences 11.12 36.36 52.52
Criminal record 11.09 33.94 54.97
Political ideology 8.56 37.30 54.14
Deeply religious 8.42 38.78 52.80
Note. N p 600.
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respondent’s attribution to genetics across all 18 traits in
table 1.
The results are presented in table 2. The demographic
variables suggest that older, less educated, churchgoing in-
dividuals are more likely to be conservative, as might have
been expected, but the more relevant finding is that after
controlling for these variables, there is a negative correlation
between conservatism and the tendency to attribute a wide
variety of traits to genetic causes. In other words, contrary to
conventional wisdom, self-reported liberals are actually more
likely than conservatives to attribute trait variation to genet-
ics; these results hold if, instead of looking at global attri-
butional tendencies, we run separate models for each of the
18 traits (see the appendix). When this is done, we find that
for none of the 18 traits are genetic attributions significantly
related to being conservative, and for 4 of the 18 traits there
is a significant relationship with being liberal.
What about tolerance? Are those who attribute variation
in traits to genetics less likely to be tolerant of diversity, as
conventional wisdom anticipates? In compiling our first sur-
vey instrument, we singled out 5 of the 18 traits in table 1 for
additional items on tolerance: homosexuality, drug addiction,
obesity, mental disabilities, and political ideology. We tapped
respondents’ openness to and tolerance of individuals with
each of these traits, using items common in the tolerance lit-
erature (Schnittker 2000). We created models similar to those
presented in table 2, except that we now include three addi-
tional variables. One is labeled “trait used to describe”; it is a
dummy variable that captures whether the respondent re-
ported that he or she had “a family member or close friend”
who has been described as having that particular trait. Another
is a control for ideological self-placement (described above),
and the third is party identification (7p strong Republican;
1p strong Democrat). In addition, for the five tolerance
models, the variable labeled “genetic attribution” changes
from mean attributions across all 18 variables to attributions
for the particular trait (homosexuals, drug addicts, obese
people, etc.) that is being tolerated—or not.
With other variables controlled, the tendency to attrib-
ute the source of a trait to genetics correlates positively with
tolerance of homosexuals, drug addicts, the obese, and the
mentally disabled (p ! :01). The only exception to the pat-
tern is tolerance of those with opposing political beliefs (see
also Suhay and Jayaratne 2013), and this finding should be
taken with a grain of salt since the relationship appears to be
driven by distorted variance (two-thirds assigned 0% of po-
litical beliefs to genetics, and a small number of outliers as-
signed 100%).
Our first survey did not include items on race, so we
conducted a second survey a few months later. To measure
genetic trait attributions, we included 12 of the 18 attri-
butional items from table 1 (height, obesity, eating disor-
ders, anxiety, openness, and religiosity were excluded to make
room for the additional racial items). We focus on just two
racial groups here: whites and African Americans. The sur-
vey contained items designed to tap five aspects of racial
Table 2. Partial Correlations for Ideology, Tolerance, and Genetic Attributions
Tolerance Toward:
Variable
Conservative
Ideology Homosexuals Drug Addicts
Obese
People
Mentally
Disabled
People with Opposite
Ideology
Genetic attribution 2.208** .370** .172** .147** .248** 2.106**
Female 2.033 .113* .044 .059 .116* 2.041
Age .206** 2.089 2.177** 2.045 2.143** 2.055
White .073 2.017 .159** .070 .105* .049
Religious attendance .332** 2.127** .117* 2.053 .092 .010
Education 2.099* .122** .053 .123** .030 .099**
Income .047 .025 2.011 2.019 2.060 .016
Conservative (ideology) 2.164** 2.152** 2.083 2.122** 2.099**
Republican (partisanship) .058 2.105* 2.022 2.079 2.037
Trait used to describe .197** .160** .219** .057 .026
Note. For conservative ideology, we include the respondents’ average attribution to genetics for all 18 traits. For the five tolerance measures, we include the
respondents’ attribution to genetics for that particular trait. N p 458.
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.
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attitudes. The first three were the six-item measure of “sym-
bolic racism” (sometimes referred to as racial resentment), a
two-item indicator of support for race-based affirmative ac-
tion, and a four-item indicator of racial tolerance structurally
similar to the tolerance measures used in table 2. We also
included a measure of the extent to which people rated Afri-
can Americans and whites differently on scales of intelli-
gence, athletic ability, criminal tendencies, and conscientious-
ness, as well as a measure of the extent to which African
Americans are perceived as being more homogeneous than
whites (another indicator of racial biases).
We calculated the partial correlation coefficients for each
of these five measures of racial attitudes in models parallel to
those employed in table 2, and the results are presented in
table 3. Coefficients for the control variables are not particu-
larly surprising. For four of the five racial variables, however,
the results are inconsistent with the expectation that genetic
attributions are associated with unenlightened racial attitudes.
The coefficients for affirmative action, perception of racial dif-
ferences, and differences in perception of group homogeneity
are statistically insignificant, and the coefficient for symbolic
racism actually suggests that those making genetic attributions
are significantly less likely to be racist. Even the one instance
in which genetic attributions seem to be associated with ra-
cially unfavorable attitudes—racial tolerance—is questionable
since it drops below statistical significance when the analysis
is repeated with only white respondents (see the appendix).
Regardless, the overall picture in table 3 is at odds with the
widespread belief that attributing variation in individual be-
haviors to genetics correlates with repugnant racial perceptions
and attitudes, appearing instead to have little overall effect.
In sum, we find that a key assumption underlying pre-
vailing intellectual dogma—that compassionate, tolerant, ra-
cially enlightened individuals tend to deny that genetics is
relevant to human variation—is factually inaccurate. Rather,
people who accord genetics a role in explaining the different
traits that humans possess are significantly more likely to be
politically liberal; significantly more likely to be tolerant of
homosexuals, drug addicts, the obese, and those with mental
disabilities; and no more likely to hold unenlightened racial
attitudes. Instead, those who believe traits are under personal
control are the ones who tend to hold less tolerant attitudes.
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